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Abstract
Does foreign ownership improve corporate performance, or do foreign firms merely 
select more productive targets for takeover? Do workers benefit from foreign acqui-
sitions? We answer these questions by comparing the before/after change in several 
performance indicators of Czech firms subject to foreign takeover after 1997, i.e., after 
the initial waves of privatization were completed, with the corresponding performance 
change of matched companies that remained domestically owned until 2005. We find that 
the impact of foreign investors on domestic acquisitions is significantly positive only in 
non-exporting manufacturing industries or those with low import penetration, while it is 
small in both services and manufacturing industries competing on international markets.
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is likely to be one of the key channels of 
economic development for middle-income countries, particularly so for the post-
communist economies of Central Europe (e.g., Alfaro et al., 2004; Neuhaus, 2006). 
Foreign-owned companies, a group that includes both greenfields and foreign 
acquisitions, are consistently more productive than domestically owned firms, as 
Sabirianova et al. (2005) demonstrate for the Czech Republic and Russia.1 Taking 
the productivity advantage of FDI as a given, a large literature therefore studies its 
indirect impacts on domestic companies—productivity spillovers within and across 
industries (e.g., Javorcik, 2004; Gorodnichenko et al., 2007). However, there is 
somewhat less work available measuring the direct causal productivity effects of 
foreign takeovers of domestic companies, even though such measurements are im-
portant for evaluating the benefits of greenfield vs. brownfield FDI support and for 
understanding the nature of FDI flows.
There is, of course, a large literature studying the effects of early-transition 
privatization of state-owned companies in post-communist economies. In one of 
the most complete analyses, Brown et al. (2006) suggest that privatizing state-owned 
companies to foreign entities during the 1990s generated larger productivity gains 
than privatization to domestic owners. In several transition economies, however, 
large FDI inflows started only after the mass privatization programs were completed. 
* We would like to thank Jan Hanousek, Peter Katuščák, and Evžen Kočenda for useful comments. 
Support from GACR grant No. 402/06/1293 is gratefully acknowledged, as is access to the ASPEKT 
data provided by Jan Hanousek.
1 For evidence on the productivity dominance of foreign-owned firms, see Barba Navaretti and Venables 
(2004) and Bellak (2004). Helpman et al. (2004) and Girma et al. (2004) study the superior productivity of 
domestic multinationals with respect to domestic exporters and non-exporters.
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The Czech Republic is a case in point, as it received a massive inflow of foreign 
capital only after 1997.2
In this paper, we therefore provide evidence on the recent direct effects 
of FDI. We assess the effects of over 300 cases of foreign takeovers observed in 
a sample of Czech firms between 1997 and 2005. We do not differentiate takeover 
effects by the ownership type of domestic companies, so our analysis is not related 
to the issue of privatization. Unlike most of the work on privatization or, indeed, on 
foreign takeovers, we analyze not only manufacturing companies, but also the service 
sector, where the share of foreign capital as of 2005 was about 40% of that in manu-
facturing industries.3 We contrast the takeover effects not only across the services/
manufacturing divide, but also across the groups of exporting and non-exporting 
manufacturing industries, as these are likely to differ in terms of the strategies that 
multinationals use when entering a given sector. While acquiring a domestic com-
pany in a non-exporting sector eliminates a potential domestic competitor, acquiring 
a local company in an internationally competitive industry is more likely to be 
motivated by high domestic-company performance and may therefore lead to smaller 
takeover productivity improvements. Put differently, acquiring a domestic firm ex-
posed to international competition may generate smaller takeover effects, as such 
firm is already “disciplined” by international competition.4 Similarly, we contrast the re-
sults across manufacturing industries that face significant import penetration (inter-
national competition) and those that do not.
Further, we follow Brown et al. (2010) in studying not only the productivity 
effects of ownership changes, but also the effects on workers. Specifically, we ask 
whether foreign takeovers affect the wage bill of the company, i.e., the total earnings 
of employees. The related question of interest to workers as well as policy makers is 
whether scale effects of takeovers outweigh the cost-cutting potentially associated 
with the higher productivity that foreign owners impose on their acquisitions and, 
therefore, whether foreign acquisitions ultimately benefit domestic workers, be 
it through higher wages per worker or higher employment. Unfortunately, employ-
ment is not available in our data so we cannot decompose the wage bill effect into 
employment and wage rate effects.
A fundamental problem with the identification of these causal effects is that 
multinational companies are likely to select the best domestic firms as acquisition 
targets. In the absence of credible instrumental variables, most studies attempt to 
achieve progress on causality by conditioning on pre-takeover performance. An in-
creasingly popular technique—see, for example, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) or 
Girma et al. (2007)—is to match foreign acquisitions to domestic firms with a similar 
2 Benefiting from investment subsidies and tax breaks introduced in 1997, Czech FDI inflows rose from 
below 3% of GDP in 1996 to 1997 to over 10% during 1999 to 2002. As a result, Czech FDI stock per 
capita reached EUR 5,256 in 2005, the end of our sample frame, which compares favorably with the 2005 
FDI stock in Slovakia (2,721) or Poland (2,070).
3 Out of over ten studies of foreign ownership effects in the Czech Republic during the 1990s, the only one 
to cover the service sector is Kosová (2010), who focuses on the indirect effects of FDI. Outside Central 
Europe, only Aitken and Harrison (1999) work with non-manufacturing data. The related literature is dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 2.
4 There is a growing theoretical literature on how firms choose modes of foreign market access, but little 
empirical work on the topic; see, for example, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) for a general equilibrium model 
with heterogeneous firms or Qiu and Wang (2011) for an empirical analysis of a multinational’s choice 
between greenfield investment and cross-border merger.
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probability of being acquired by multinationals and to compare the before/after per-
formance changes between the two groups. As argued by Blundell and Costa Dias 
(2000), this approach combines careful conditioning on observables through match-
ing on pre-takeover performance (trends) with before/after differencing that eliminates
time-constant unobservables. We follow their suggestion and apply the matched dif-
ference-in-differences approach to our sample of Czech manufacturing and service 
firms, effectively comparing the change in performance of companies taken over by 
foreign investors between the moment of acquisition and one to three years later with 
the corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies.
Using several performance indicators, we find the impact of foreign investors 
on domestic acquisitions to vary across types of target industries. Based on data 
covering the experience of Czech firms around the moment of the Czech Republic’s 
entry into the EU, we uncover significant effects of foreign takeovers only in the non-
exporting manufacturing sector and, alternatively, in the sector with low import 
penetration, consistent with the argument that firms in highly open manufacturing 
industries successfully face direct international competition and do not need to be 
“disciplined” by foreign owners. Further, we find no effect of foreign takeovers on 
the performance of service-sector companies.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section covers the existing work 
on takeover effects and ownership change, with a focus on results available for 
the Czech Republic. Our empirical strategy and data are described in Sections 3 
and 4, respectively, while Section 5 presents the findings. The last section concludes.
2. Literature Review
There are numerous studies estimating the direct effects that foreign investors 
have on the performance of domestic companies during the early-transition mass-
privatization period (for surveys, see, for example, Djankov and Murrell, 2002, or 
Estrin et al., 2009). In this section, we first highlight those that focus on the Czech 
Republic and we then discuss groups of studies of ownership effects that differ in 
their preferred estimation technique.
A small literature estimates the positive effects of foreign ownership on total 
factor productivity (TFP), or its growth, in the Czech Republic using data from 1992 
to 1998 covering the mass privatization process (e.g., Djankov and Hoekman, 2000; 
Jarolím, 2000; Damijan et al., 2003; Evenett and Voicu, 2003). These studies typical-
ly use small samples of manufacturing or publicly traded firms to estimate linear 
regressions with exogeneity in foreign status (or sample selection corrections) based 
on various arguments, including the exclusion of the firm’s initial efficiency or 
the relative size of the given firm within its industry from the company performance 
regression. In the most detailed and careful study of the Czech mass-privatization 
experience to date, Hanousek et al. (2007) instrument for ownership changes using 
pre-market initial conditions and detect positive effects of foreign ownership on 
various performance measures driven mainly by foreign industrial firms.5
5 Several recent papers also ask about the indirect effects of FDI on domestic Czech companies through 
productivity spillovers within and across industries (see, for example, Kosová, 2010, or Stančík, 2007). 
The key identification problem of this literature, similar to the need for exogenous determinants of foreign 
ownership in the work on the direct effects of FDI, is to identify variation in industry FDI inflow that is 
not driven by (estimates of) future growth of that industry.
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The research on Czech firms undergoing mass privatization is typical of most 
of the existing work on ownership effects from other countries in that it relies on 
panel-data techniques and postulates exclusion restrictions that allow for instru-
mental variable (IV) strategies. Some of this work combines the IV approach with 
fixed-effects estimation conditioning on a lagged dependent variable and requires 
(weak) exogeneity of lagged outcome and control variables (e.g., Benfratello and 
Sembenelli, 2006). The identification of such dynamic GMM models, however, is 
fragile when the variables of interest are sufficiently persistent.
Convincing quasi-experiments affecting ownership but not performance are 
seldom found, especially once the focus shifts beyond pre-market initial conditions 
to late-transition data. Another strand of research thus attempts to control for the cor-
relation between ownership type and company unobservables in a simple static 
regression framework using company fixed effects and/or time trends. A prime 
example of this body of work is provided by the analysis of long panel data from four 
transition countries by Brown et al. (2006), who suggest that privatizing state-owned 
companies to foreign entities generates larger productivity gains than privatization to 
domestic owners. The basic goal of these regressions is to compare the performance 
of domestic and foreign-owned firms after conditioning on both time-constant unob-
servables (captured by the firm fixed effects) and pre-takeover performance change 
(captured by the firm-specific time trends). However, to the extent that much of 
the data used in the estimation of these firm time trends comes from after the owner-
ship change, these methods may “over-control” and lead to under-estimation of 
the effect of interest.6 Furthermore, regression-based techniques may suffer from 
a lack of “common support” (Barsky et al., 2002) when the characteristics of firms 
acquired by foreign investors differ from those of a significant share of firms in 
the data that remain domestic.
An increasingly popular alternative conditioning technique is to match foreign 
acquisitions to domestic firms with a similar probability of being acquired by multi-
nationals based on pre-takeover performance and to compare the before/after 
performance changes between the two groups. Examples of this approach, which 
combines careful conditioning on observables through propensity score matching on 
pre-takeover performance (possibly including performance trends) with before/after 
differencing that eliminates time-constant unobservables, are the studies of Arnold 
and Javorcik (2009) and Girma et al. (2007), who study Indonesian and UK manu-
facturing firms, respectively, and uncover significant foreign-takeover TFP effects.
Finally, while there are several results available on the effects of foreign 
takeovers on firm productivity, less attention has been paid to the effects on firm 
wage bill and employment, even though these two variables are important from 
the perspective of the political economy of FDI (Conyon et al., 2002, is an early 
exception). Recently, Brown et al. (2010) combine evidence on productivity effects 
with estimates of wage and employment effects of ownership changes of manufac-
turing firms of four transition economies (but not the Czech Republic); they suggest 
that foreign takeovers have scale-expansion effects that dominate the productivity-
improvement effects, leading to a positive effect on workers’ wages.
6 This issue can be addressed using pre- and post-acquisition trends.
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Similarly, there is so far little evidence on how foreign-takeover effects differ 
across different types of industries or investment strategies. The theory typically 
classifies FDI into market-oriented and export-oriented, with market-oriented FDI 
being attracted by the size and growth of the host market while export-oriented FDI 
looks for cost competitiveness and productivity.7 It is also argued that in contrast to 
horizontal FDI, vertical or export-oriented FDI often involves relocating parts of 
the production chain to the host country (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). One may 
therefore expect the effects on local companies to differ across sectors more or less 
open to international competition. Companies operating in product markets exposed 
to international competition are more likely to operate according to international best 
practice and are therefore in less need of being “disciplined” by international owners. 
In contrast, if local markets are protected against foreign goods, foreign companies 
are likely to invest in those countries in order to access those markets.
In this paper, we apply matched difference-in-differences comparison to 
a sample of Czech manufacturing and service-sector firms from 1995–2005. Unlike 
the existing analyses of the Czech Republic, or indeed of other countries from 
Central Europe, we estimate the effects of foreign takeovers that took place after 
1997, i.e., after the mass privatization programs were completed. Unlike almost all of 
the work on both transition and developing economies, we study the experience 
of not only manufacturing, but also service-sector firms, and we differentiate between 
industries with different levels of exposure to international competition. Finally, we 
also measure the consequences of foreign acquisitions not only for company per-
formance indicators, but also for their wage bills—a variable more interesting for 
workers subject to such an ownership change.
3. Estimation Approach
To circumvent the selection into foreign-owned status (“cherry picking” by 
foreign investors), we draw on the microeconometric evaluation literature and employ
propensity-score matching to compare changes in performance associated with
foreign takeovers to changes in performance in highly similar companies that remain 
domestic. Specifically, one can estimate the causal effect of foreign ownership on
a given outcome indicator by assuming that the assignment to foreign-owned status 
is as good as random conditional on observables summarized in the propensity score, 
i.e., within a group of firms that share a similar predicted probability of being 
acquired by foreign investors    1 11|t t tP X P FDI X   , where t corresponds to 
the timing of the foreign acquisition. The outcome measure of interest in our case 
consists of the difference between a company’s performance at the time of being 
acquired and one to three years later, i.e., t k tY Y  , where k = 1, 2, 3.
The causal effect of interest—the average effect of treatment on the treated—
is defined as the difference between the average outcome measure of firms that were 
acquired by foreign investors, denoted 1, 1, | 1t k t tE Y Y FDI    , which is easy to 
obtain from data, and the hypothetical counterfactual outcome of these same firms 
had they not been acquired: 0, 0, | 1t k t tE Y Y FDI    . The counterfactual is esti-
7 Alternatively, export-oriented FDI can be viewed as cost-seeking FDI; see, for example, ISGEP (2008).
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mated based on the conditional independence assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983) as the average outcome of firms that were not acquired by foreign investors, 
but that had the same probability of being acquired as of time t—the same value of 
the propensity score:
                0, 0, 1 0, 0, 1| 1, | 0,t k t t t t k t t tE Y Y FDI P X E Y Y FDI P X                     (1)
The probability of being acquired (the propensity score) is assumed to depend 
on a set of time-changing observable characteristics, chiefly firm-level balance-sheet 
indicators, entered both contemporaneously and lagged to capture pre-takeover per-
formance trends; the exercise is performed within groups defined by (matching is 
“exact” on) year and industry.8 Equation (1) implies that a basic requirement for 
the implementation of the matching approach is a sufficiently large overlap between 
the distribution of the propensity score of the acquired and the domestic companies 
(the common support condition).9
4. Data and Descriptive Evidence
The company-level balance-sheet annual data used in this study come 
from the ASPEKT commercial database, which is a Czech source for the Amadeus
EU-wide data and is widely used in empirical research (e.g., Hanousek et al., 2007; 
Hanousek et al., 2009). Crucially, the ASPEKT data provide information on com-
panies’ ownership structure and thus allow one to identify foreign-owned companies. 
We interpret a company as foreign-owned if it has at least 10% of its equity owned 
by a foreign investor.10
The purpose of the study is to contrast the performance of domestic firms that
were acquired by foreign investors with that of firms that remain domestic-owned. 
We therefore disregard information on foreign-owned greenfields in most of 
the analysis.11 After dropping observations with inconsistent financial information, 
firms with fixed assets of less than CZK 1 million (approximately EUR 30,000), as 
well as industrial branches involving a strong regulatory role of the government,12
the resulting sample contains information on 4,049 companies from forty 2-digit 
NACE industrial sectors and covers the 1995–2005 period, generating 26,163 firm-
year observations.13
8 The procedure therefore compares FDI recipient firms with non-recipient firms at the same moment in 
time; the kernel matching procedure is implemented in the latest version of the ps-match2 Stata routine 
provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Blundell and Costa Dias (2009) offer an intuitive summary of 
the estimation approach used here.
9 An assessment of the matching quality consists of checking whether the matching procedure is able to 
balance the distribution of the relevant variables across the control and treatment group. To this effect, we 
perform two-sample t-tests as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).
10 This threshold is also used in the official definition of FDI by the Czech National Bank and in studies 
of firm-level data by Evenett and Voicu (2003), Damijan et al. (2003), and Javorcik (2004). The average 
share of a foreign investor in a Czech company in our data is 3%. The average foreign share in companies 
with at least 10% foreign ownership is 51%. We do not differentiate between various types of domestic 
ownership.
11 Greenfields were preliminarily identified as firms newly appearing in the sample with (near) 100% 
foreign ownership; all such cases were then checked manually (information on these firms was found on 
the internet) to confirm that the observed firm is in fact not an acquisition of a previously domestically 
owned company.
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Table 1  Definition of Industry-Level FDI Variables
FDI share Foreign direct investment divided by fixed assets at the 2-digit
NACE industry level. (Source: Czech National Bank)
FDI share by takeovers Industry-level fixed assets of domestic companies acquired by
foreign investors divided by industry fixed assets. (Source: Aspekt)
FDI share by greenfields Industry-level fixed assets of companies built by foreign
investors divided by industry fixed assets. (Source: Aspekt)
Table 2 Number of Companies by Year
The column “always domestic” gives the number of companies observed in a given year that 
remain domestic throughout the sample frame; the column “before acquisition” gives the number 
of domestic companies observed in a given year that are to be acquired by a foreign entity later; 
the column “after acquisition” gives the number of observed companies that are foreign-owned 
as of a given year; the column “N” gives the total number of firm observations in the sample, 
which contains no greenfields. The last column “acquisitions” gives the number of foreign acqui-
sitions in a given year.
firm-year observations
year
always 
domestic
before 
acquisition
after 
acquisition
N acquisitions
1995 1,841 244 0 2,085 0
1996 2,093 262 5 2,360 5
1997 2,236 210 64 2,510 59
1998 2,275 192 94 2,561 30
1999 2,302 162 126 2,590 36
2000 2,271 126 163 2,560 47
2001 2,242 81 199 2,522 51
2002 2,230 56 211 2,497 31
2003 2,159 31 221 2,411 29
2004 1,984 10 220 2,214 23
2005 1,638 0 215 1,853 13
Total 23,271 1,374 1,518 26,163 324
An overview of the year-ownership and industry-ownership structure of 
the sample is provided in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. In a typical year, there are 
over 2,000 companies in the data. We observe 324 cases of foreign takeovers, and 
foreign-owned data represent almost 6% of all firm-year observations. The timing of 
foreign acquisitions mimics the time series of aggregate FDI inflow as recorded by 
the Czech National Bank (CNB), rising swiftly after 1997.14 Table 3 shows that in 
some industries, as many as 20% of firms in our sample were acquired by foreign 
investors during the sample frame, while there are no foreign takeovers in several 
2-digit industries. The share of foreign capital in each industry, which reflects both 
foreign takeovers and greenfields, also varies widely, from low levels in, for example,
12 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, utilities, public administration, health and education; NACE codes 1, 2, 5, 
41, 75, 80, and 85.
13 We also observe 1,018 unique greenfields with foreign ownership in our sample, with 5,743 firm-year 
observations in total. Including the greenfields, our panel data thus have 31,906 observations.
14 To check for potential attrition bias related to ownership, we compared the exit rates of “always-
domestic” and “after-takeover” firms and found it nearly identical in all years.
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Table 3 FDI Share and Structure by Industry as of 2005
The column “N” gives the number of companies in the sample observed at least once, while the second 
column shows the (cumulative) share of these companies taken over by foreign entities. The third column 
presents the official FDI share in industry fixed assets as of 2005 and the last one shows the share of FDI 
capital in companies acquired by foreign investors (as opposed to built by them). See Table 1 for variable 
definitions. A sector is considered to be export-oriented if it exports at least 50% of its production abroad on 
average over the 1995–2005 period.
NACE N
Share 
of takeovers
FDI share
FDI share
by takeovers
Low-export manufacturing
15 Food products and beverages 327 0.09 0.23 0.03
20 Wood and wood products 154 0.08 0.19 0.02
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 29 0.14 0.51 0.02
22 Publishing and printing 162 0.12 0.23 0.01
23 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 14 0.21 0.28 0.07
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 161 0.08 0.38 0.01
27 Basic metals 99 0.12 0.29 0.01
28 Fabricated metal products 461 0.10 0.22 0.01
Total 1,407 0.10 0.28 0.03
High-export manufacturing
17 Textiles 95 0.09 0.17 0.02
18 Wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 22 0.00 0.08 0.00
19 Leather and leather products 25 0.08 0.03 0.00
24 Chemicals and chemical products 139 0.12 0.31 0.03
25 Rubber and plastic products 68 0.15 0.41 0.01
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 119 0.13 0.28 0.06
30 Office machinery and computers 22 0.09 0.50 0.02
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 86 0.05 0.44 0.04
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment 38 0.08 0.65 0.01
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 49 0.06 0.42 0.01
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 15 0.20 0.57 0.44
35 Other transport equipment 13 0.08 0.13 0.04
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 27 0.07 0.12 0.01
37 Recycling 36 0.03 0.17 0.03
Total 754 0.10 0.38 0.04
Services
50 Sale and repair of motor vehicles 140 0.06 0.14 0.01
51 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles 663 0.06 0.32 0.01
52 Retail trade; repair of personal goods 290 0.05 0.27 0.03
55 Hotels and restaurants 49 0.04 0.06 0.01
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 22 0.09 0.08 0.00
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 10 0.00 0.01 0.00
64 Post and telecommunications 9 0.11 0.52 0.05
65 Financial intermediation 152 0.08 0.73 0.06
66 Insurance and pension funding 26 0.15 0.80 0.06
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 32 0.13 0.38 0.05
70 Real estate services 65 0.09 0.03 0.00
72 Computer and related services 15 0.07 0.38 0.01
73 Research and development 8 0.00 0.02 0.00
74 Other business services 51 0.12 0.35 0.02
Total 1,532 0.07 0.13 0.01
Other industries
10 Mining of coal and lignite 19 0.00 0.01 0.00
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 4 0.00 0.05 0.00
14 Other mining and quarrying 57 0.11 0.34 0.02
45 Construction 276 0.08 0.10 0.00
Total 356 0.08 0.08 0.01
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the leather or hotel and restaurant industries, to 0.8 in insurance and pension 
funding.15
We list 2-digit NACE industries in three groups: services, and high-export and 
low-export manufacturing.16 An industry is considered to be a “high-export” industry 
if it exports at least 50% of its production on average over the period 1995–2005.17
The average share of foreign-owned assets in our three groups of industries ranges 
from 13% in the service sector to 38% in the high-export manufacturing industries. 
Similarly, the share of foreign capital in a given industry in acquisitions (as opposed 
to greenfields) is the lowest in the service sector. Most foreign investors in services 
apparently build greenfields, which may reflect the relatively low Czech share of 
employment in the service sector in EU comparison.
For the purpose of comparing foreign takeover effects in Section 5, we also 
use another alternative industry categorization. Specifically, instead of dividing manu-
facturing industries based on strong exporting performance, we also grouped them 
based on the extent to which they face international competition on the local market. 
Specifically, we measure industry import penetration (again, as a share of production 
using OECD-data averages over the period 1995–2005 as we did with export shares) 
and divide industries into below- and above-average import penetration groups. With 
reference to the industry definitions provided in Table 3, low-import industries are 
15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 28, 34, and 36. This group therefore shares six industries with 
the low-export group and three with the high-export group.
Next, Table 4 provides summary statistics of all firm-level variables used in 
the estimation. (All relevant variables were converted to real values using industry-
specific deflators.)18 Balance-sheet information is used to form four corporate per-
formance indicators: the ratio of profit to total assets; a simple measure of total factor 
productivity (TFP corresponds to the residuals from the OLS industry-specific firm-
fixed-effect regressions of company value added on fixed assets and staff costs);19 and 
the company wage bill (unfortunately, employment is not available), which is also used 
as the share in company total assets (similar to profits over total assets).
15 To check the representativeness of the ASPEKT data with respect to foreign ownership, we compare 
the official FDI figures (from the CNB) listed in the third column of Table 3 with estimates of the share 
of foreign fixed assets based on our sample (calculated by summing the capital of both foreign acquisitions 
and greenfields). The correlation between the two measures across 2-digit NACE industries, weighted by 
the share of fixed assets of each industry covered by the sample, is 0.96.
16 A small group of “other industries” is also included in the data when we analyze all industries.
17 The output and export statistics were obtained from the OECD. We alternatively defined high-export 
manufacturing industries using only the 1995–1997 time window, which led to the reclassification of four 
2-digit NACE categories from the “high-export” to the “low-export” group; this change, however, had 
no material effect on the estimated effects of foreign acquisition reported in the next section. The same 
applied when we used OECD data on Slovak industries to classify Czech industries.
18 The producer price index data comes from the Czech Statistical Office.
19 Our results are not materially affected when we drop the firm fixed effects from the TFP regression. 
Ideally, one should acknowledge that inputs in the production function are unlikely to be exogenous and 
apply the techniques proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). However, this 
methodology requires information about investment, materials, or energy inputs, which are not available in 
our data. Further, the frequently applied Olley-Pakes correction rests on the assumption that factors fully 
adjust to shocks in each period and markets are perfectly competitive, which may not hold in a transition 
economy. When Javorcik (2004) introduces the Olley-Pakes procedure in a similar exercise, most of 
the estimated coefficients are virtually identical.
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Table 4 Summary Statistics
All financial variables are in million euros, 2000 prices. Total factor productivity (TFP) is meas-
ured as the residuals from the firm-fixed-effect regressions of value added on fixed assets and 
staff costs by 2-digit NACE industry. The matched sample is defined based on the p-score esti-
mation from the first column of Table 6.
variable
whole sample matched sample
observa-
tions
mean median
std. 
deviation
observa-
tions
mean median
std. 
deviation
Total assets 26,143 21.29 3.78 146.79 10,240 24.04 4.44 174.73
Age 26,055 6.61 6.00 4.37 10,240 6.97 7.00 3.86
Profit 26,145 0.54 0.07 10.41 10,240 0.49 0.10 10.49
Value added 24,077 4.08 0.98 23.26 9,915 4.42 1.12 25.23
Wage bill 17,528 1.73 0.51 5.86 7,642 1.81 0.56 6.47
Fixed assets 25,503 13.35 1.74 126.35 10,194 15.66 2.01 149.63
Staff costs 25,127 1.95 0.59 7.28 10,222 2.19 0.70 8.50
Profit to total 
assets
26,125 0.00 0.02 2.23 10,240 0.02 0.03 0.20
Wage bill to total 
assets
17,522 0.24 0.12 1.79 7,642 0.18 0.12 0.25
TFP 21,679 0.05 1.15 23.76 9,623 -0.22 0.82 20.86
We view these performance indicators as complementary. For instance, if 
productivity increases are reflected fully in rising wages, they will not be detected in 
our TFP indicator; instead, provided that employment is not declining, they will be 
captured using the wage bill measure. Next, performance indicators may be noisier in 
the service sector (Giovannini and Cave, 2005). More specifically, TFP is potentially 
an imperfect measure of productivity outside manufacturing due to the importance of 
intangibles in the service sector. One might therefore prefer a measure such as return 
on assets (ROA), which is not available in our data. However, our profits-over-total-
assets measure is similar to ROA20 so this is our preferred performance measure 
in services. The study of the evolution of wages per unit of assets is motivated by 
the fact that company size can also be affected by foreign takeover. Finally, while we 
cannot separate employment from wage rate effects, we believe that the overall wage 
bill, which summarizes the two effects, is a useful summary measure of foreign take-
over effects from the workers’ perspective.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics not only for the original sample, but also 
for the matched sub-sample of firms where the “treatment” and “control” firms used are 
only those that could be matched to their counterparts based on the estimated propensity 
score within industry and year cells.21 Imposing the common support condition leads to 
shedding of almost half of the data, suggesting that common support is indeed a relevant 
concern in our estimation. In particular, several of the service-sector industries are lost 
from the matching comparison, including telecommunications and computer services.22
20 ROA equals net income over total assets. In contrast, our profits over total assets measure is based on 
the operating profit measure, which does not adjust for interest and taxes.
21 The propensity score controls for profits over total assets as well as for other firm-level variables; see 
Table 6 for details.
22 Matching also effectively excludes observations with extreme values of profits over total assets. 
Dropping those observations manually (i.e., those that exceed 0.15 in absolute value) does not lead to size-
able changes in the estimated coefficients.
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Table 5 OLS-based Performance Comparison of Ownership Types
The least-squares regressions ask whether foreign-owned firms out-perform domestic-owned ones
on average within years and industries.
Profit/TA TFP Wage Bill/TA Wage Bill
Foreign -0.016 0.119*** -0.729* 0.211***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.373) (0.044)
Foreign-2Y-prior -0.369 0.068 -0.168* 0.278***
(0.275) (0.043) (0.086) (0.097)
Foreign greenfield 0.055*** 0.232*** 0.915* 0.346***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.477) (0.047)
ln SC 0.019***
(0.006)
ln FA 0.408***
(0.005)
NACE*year dummies         yes          yes          yes          yes
N 30,660 26,449 21,738 21,505
R2 0.024 0.039 0.014 0.367
Notes: SC stands for staff costs, FA is company fixed assets, “Foreign” is a dummy that equals 1 for all years 
after a foreign acquisition, “Foreign-2Y-prior” is a dummy that equals 1 during the two years before 
the entry of foreign equity into a domestic company, “Foreign greenfield” is a dummy that equals 1 for 
foreign-owned greenfields. Domestic-owned companies are in the base group. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Before estimating the causal effects of foreign ownership, we provide one last 
descriptive comparison. Specifically, we ask whether foreign-owned firms outperform
domestic-owned ones on average within years and industries. We answer this 
descriptive question by running a simple OLS regression with our panel data (in-
cluding greenfields), where we condition on the interaction of year and 2-digit NACE 
industry dummies as well as three ownership indicators: a dummy that equals 1 
during the two years before the entry of foreign equity into a domestic company; 
a dummy that equals 1 for all years after the foreign acquisition; and a separate 
dummy for foreign-owned greenfields; domestic-owned companies are the base 
group. The results are presented in Table 5.
Using such simple comparisons, and additionally controlling for the logarithm 
of firm staff costs, we find that greenfields have a statistically significantly higher 
level of profits over total assets (by 0.06) compared to domestic-owned companies, 
while the differences between domestic-owned company-year observations and those 
for firms (about to be) acquired by foreign investors are not statistically discernible. 
Similarly, using TFP as the dependent variable, and conditioning only on year-
industry dummies, we find that all foreign-owned companies display statistically 
significantly higher productivity, with the effect being higher (at 0.23) for greenfields 
than for acquisitions (0.12). Ownership comparisons based on wage bills normalized 
by total assets in the third column of Table 5 confirm the dominant position of green-
fields, but result in negative coefficients for foreign takeovers. In contrast, using 
the wage bill as the dependent variable and controlling for the logarithm of firm fixed 
assets, we find that all three foreign-ownership dummy coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant, ranging from 0.21 for foreign acquisitions to 0.35 for green-
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fields. This set of estimates is consistent with faster growth of assets relative to wage 
bills after (prior to) entry of foreign equity. For comparative purposes, we prefer 
the last specification as it controls for size in a flexible manner consistent with 
standard estimates in the literature. In sum, among Czech companies, foreign owner-
ship appears to be associated with higher productivity, profits, or wage bills. In 
particular, greenfields attain the highest level for each of our performance indicators, 
as expected, which is reassuring in terms of the quality of the indicator definitions.
5. Main Results
5.1 Propensity Score Estimation
Our first task is to estimate the propensity score—the probability that an in-
dividual firm with certain characteristics is acquired by a foreign entity in a given 
year. Such analysis is interesting in its own right, and it also provides the key con-
tinuous conditioning variable for the matching exercise. A set of logit specifications 
for the probability of foreign takeover is reported in Table 6. The propensity score is 
predicted based on company age and either fixed assets or staff costs (depending on 
the outcome performance measure: profit or wage bill over assets, wage bill, and TFP); 
each specification then additionally controls for the level of the outcome variable from 
one and two years prior to the current year, which is meant to control for both the pre-
takeover level of and the recent trend in performance.23
Older firms are more likely to be acquired, as are larger firms and those with 
higher staff costs. A positive (negative) trend in profitability (productivity) appears 
to predict the chances of a foreign takeover. For example, taking the statistically 
insig-nificant coefficient on the profit level from time 1t  as corresponding to a near-
zero coefficient, the estimates in the first column correspond to a positive 0.005 
coefficient on the trend in profits over assets (i.e., the change between the lagged 
profitability indicator from 1t  and 2t  ). Put differently, higher lagged TFP level 
is associated with a higher probability of foreign equity entering a given firm. Wage 
bills do not predict foreign equity entry, but higher levels of wage bills per total 
assets lower the chances of a takeover.24 These propensity scores, which are con-
sistent with foreign investors “cherry picking” domestic firms, are used in the dif-
ference-in-differences with matching estimation in the next section.25
23 We choose the conditioning set for each outcome measure separately to allow for maximum control for 
“cherry picking” on the relevant measure while retaining a parsimonious specification. Similarly, we ex-
clude staff costs and fixed assets from the TFP-relevant propensity score, as this outcome measure (its 
lagged values) already controls for these two variables.
24 The estimated propensity score coefficients are not materially affected when we add 2-digit industry and 
year dummies, i.e., the variables on which we match “exactly”.
25 To assess how well the propensity score performed in balancing observables across the matched treat-
ment and controls, we performed two-sample t-tests suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and 
evaluated the pseudo R2 statistics before and after matching. There were no systematic differences in 
the distribution of covariates after matching and the pseudo-R2 was close to zero (0.01, down from 0.06 
before matching). Similar conclusions come from F-tests on the joint significance of all regressors. How-
ever, one may be concerned that since the share of domestic companies in our sample is shrinking over 
time (from 88% to 65%), the quality of the match could be deteriorating over time as well. For this reason, 
we performed a series of t-tests using subsamples based on 4-year moving windows of the data. The evolu-
tion of the pseudo-R2 values measured after matching does suggest some deterioration in match quality 
over time, with a threefold rise over the sample frame, but the values generally stay under 0.1.
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Table 6 P-score Estimation
The table presents the marginal effects from Logit estimation asking whether a domestic com-
pany becomes foreign-owned.
Age 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Age2 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln SCt-1 0.017***
(0.002)
ln FAt-1 0.014***
(0.003)
PROFIT/TAt-1 0.004
(0.004)
PROFIT/TAt-2 -0.005**
(0.002)
ln TFPt-1 0.005
(0.004)
ln TFPt-2 0.011***
(0.004)
WAGE BILL/TAt-1 -0.063**
(0.032)
WAGE BILL/TAt-2 0.0003
(0.0017)
ln WAGE BILLt-1 -0.009
(0.010)
ln WAGE BILLt-2 0.015
(0.010)
N 17,274 16,194 12,217 12,149
χ2 188.132 141.553 95.07 125.229
pseudo R2 0.065 0.045 0.045 0.076
Notes: Age stands for years since company incorporation, FA stands for company fixed assets, SC is staff 
costs, TA is total assets, PROFIT stands for profit/loss, and TFP denotes company total factor 
productivity. All financial variables are in thousands of CZK. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
they have been corrected for clustering at company level.  
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
We also estimated propensity scores separately for the industry groups dis-
played in Table 3 (these results are available upon request). Although noisy, these 
estimates suggest differences in takeover strategies. The pre-acquisition trend in 
profits over assets comes mainly from the service sector, while the estimates for 
the low-export sector are less consistent with “cherry picking,” perhaps suggesting 
that company performance may be less important for the acquisition decision in this 
sector.26
26 In an earlier version of the paper, we also found that while the existence of greenfield FDI does not 
predict future takeover probability at the industry level, a higher share of takeovers in industry fixed assets 
does predict future foreign equity entry.
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Table 7  Matching Results—Profit per Total Assets
The table presents a comparison of the change in performance of companies taken over by 
foreign investors between one year before acquisition and one to three years after acquisition 
with the corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies. See Section 3 
for industry grouping. The performance measure is profit over total assets (PROFIT/TA).
All
industries
Low-export
Manufacturing
High-import Services
High-export Low-import
t + 1 0.032 0.058* 0.018 0.078* 0.006 -0.008
(0.027) (0.034) (0.022) (0.043) (0.026) (0.023)
N 12,993 5,580 2,899 5,249 3,230 3,463
N treated matched 207 100 47 89 58 41
N controls matched 12,760 5,469 2,844 5,147 3,166 3,416
t + 2 0.210*** 0.138 -0.003 0.151*** -0.006 0.023
(0.085) (0.090) (0.108) (0.038) (0.025) (0.041)
N 10,275 4,477 2,332 4,206 2,603 2,647
N treated matched 172 84 40 74 54 33
N controls matched 10,075 4,383 2,282 4,121 2,544 2,609
t + 3 -0.073 -0.017 -0.028 0.019 -0.224 0.020
(0.067) (0.191) (0.036) (0.024) (0.201) (0.054)
N 7,935 3,500 1,833 3,284 2,049 1,984
N treated matched 143 70 38 60 46 25
N controls matched 7,766 3,421 1,788 3,213 1,996 1,954
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; they have been corrected for clustering at company 
level.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
5.2 Foreign-Ownership Effects
In this section, we report the results of the matched difference-in-differences 
analysis of the performance change gap between domestic and foreign companies 
one to three years after acquisition. Tables 7 to 10 show the results for the four per-
formance indicators we study. There is no clear pattern of takeover effects in wage 
bills per total assets and the estimated effects are small. For the other three perfor-
mance indicators, however, we find that foreign ownership leads to substantial im-
provements in corporate performance in low-export and low-import manufacturing 
industries, with the strongest impact two to three years after the foreign takeover.27
The estimated effects are remarkably similar in the low-import and low-export 
groups. In contrast, the results imply no significant effects (with the exception of one 
coefficient out of the 36 estimated) for manufacturing industries exposed to interna-
tional competition and in the service sector. The findings thus suggest that high 
industry openness defined using both export and import shares curbs the effects of 
foreign acquisitions on company performance. The absence of takeover effects in 
the service sector could correspond to market regulation or performance measure-
ment issues in services.
The magnitude of the estimated effects in the low-import (low-export) indus-
tries is economically significant, too. For example, the two-year change in profits
27 Girma et al. (2007) uncover a similar time pattern in their study of foreign ownership effects.
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Table 8  Matching Results—Total Factor Productivity
The table presents a comparison of the change in performance of companies taken over by 
foreign investors between one year before acquisition and one to three years after acquisition 
with the corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies. See Section 3 
for industry grouping. The performance measure is the logarithm of total factor productivity (ln TFP); 
see Table 4 for the definition of TFP.
All
industries
Low-export
Manufacturing High-
import
Services
High-export    Low-import
t + 1 0.006 -0.031 0.058 0.002 -0.074 0.016
(0.065) (0.056) (0.088) (0.056) (0.121) (0.163)
N 12,196 5,396 2,788 5,081 3,116 3,032
N treated matched 205 104 42 93 54 33
N controls matched 11,991 5,292 2,746 4,981 3,057 2,999
t + 2 0.063 0.011 0.007 0.021 -0.007 -0.119
(0.057) (0.053) (0.109) (0.098) (0.126) (0.223)
N 9,623 4,309 2,230 4,052 2,502 2,323
N treated matched 176 85 39 79 48 28
N controls matched 9,447 4,224 2,191 3,969 2,446 2,295
t + 3 0.157*** 0.151** 0.075 0.195** 0.016 0.038
(0.051) (0.076) (0.148) (0.094) (0.081) (0.341)
N 7,408 3,354 1,748 3,146 1,967 1,736
N treated matched 147 73 34 66 41 22
N controls matched 7,261 3,281 1,714 3,077 1,918 1,714
Notes: See Table 7.
Table 9  Matching Results—Wage Bill per Total Assets
The table presents a comparison of the change in performance of companies taken over by 
foreign investors between one year before acquisition and one to three years after acquisition 
with the corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies. See Section 3 
for industry grouping. The performance measure is wages over total assets (WAGE BILL/TA).
All
industries
Low-export
Manufacturing High-
import
Services
High-export Low-import
t + 1 -0.018** -0.008 -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.041
(0.008) (0.008) (0.036) (0.047) (0.008) (0.042)
N 9,209 4,278 2,164 3,954 2,494 2,139
N treated matched 151 79 37 70 45 27
N controls matched 9,058 4,199 2,127 3,880 2,446 2,112
t + 2 -0.013* -0.011 -0.001 -0.048 -0.019** -0.020
(0.008) (0.013) (0.032) (0.106) (0.009) (0.046)
N 7,309 3,436 1,748 3,174 2,018 1,638
N treated matched 131 66 34 57 42 22
N controls matched 7,178 3,370 1,714 3,110 1,974 1,616
t + 3 0.002 -0.006 -0.010 0.002 0.001 -0.027
(0.027) (0.023) (0.038) (0.021) (0.020) (0.034)
N 5,658 2,694 1,378 2,486 1,594 1,223
N treated matched 113 54 32 48 39 19
N controls matched 5,545 2,640 1,346 2,433 1,553 1,204
Notes: See Table 7.
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Table 10  Matching Results—Wage Bill
The table presents a comparison of the change in performance of companies taken over by 
foreign investors between one year before acquisition and one to three years after acquisition 
with the corresponding change in performance of matched domestic companies. See Section 3 
for industry grouping. The performance measure variable is the logarithm of the company wage 
bill (ln WAGE BILL).
All
industries
Manufacturing
High-import Services
Low-export High-export Low-import
t + 1 0.060 0.148* -0.146 0.065 -0.032 0.216
(0.051) (0.085) (0.113) (0.048) (0.107) (0.298)
N 9,182 4,276 2,165 3,948 2,493 2,116
N treated matched 135 68 33 59 43 24
N controls matched 9,021 4,193 2,126 3,874 2,445 2,086
t + 2 0.052 0.295*** -0.200 0.179 -0.086 -0.256
(0.059) (0.094) (0.269) (0.111) (0.157) (0.248)
N 7,295 3,438 1,749 3,170 2,017 1,626
N treated matched 111 61 29 53 37 18
N controls matched 7,155 3,366 1,713 3,106 1,973 1,601
t + 3 0.036 0.288 -0.378 0.344** -0.121 -0.816
(0.152) (0.198) (0.272) (0.168) (0.142) (0.706)
N 5,655 2,698 1,379 2,484 1,593 1,219
N treated matched 90 51 28 40 34 12
N controls matched 5,534 2,638 1,345 2,431 1,552 1,198
Notes: See Table 7.
over assets driven by a foreign acquisition corresponds to about one-tenth of the full-
sample standard deviation of all the observed two-year changes in this variable. 
Focusing on the TFP performance measure and using the estimate from three years 
after the foreign acquisition, the effect corresponds to about one-quarter of the full-
sample standard deviation in these three-year changes. Finally, the impact of a foreign
acquisition on the change in the (log) wage bill, and therefore on the workers subject 
to foreign takeover, is certainly economically significant at 30 percentage points of 
the wage bill growth rate above domestically owned firms two to three years after 
the acquisition. The timing of the onset of these effects in low-export/low-import 
manufacturing industries, with profits rising early on, wage bills throughout, and TFP 
only in year 3t  , is consistent with the presence of some short-term (“low-hanging”)
profit opportunities implemented after takeover, such as the sale of non-core assets.28
Our results for total factor productivity and wage bills are in line with those from 
Arnold and Javorcik (2009), although their estimated effects of foreign acquisitions 
in Indonesia are substantially larger in magnitude.29
28 The early improvement in profits predating improvements in productivity could also be due to higher 
market power (markups). However, one would expect such market power to remain visible in profitability 
improvements in later periods as well.
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6. Conclusion
There is a large literature studying the effects of ownership changes during 
early-transition privatization, but much less work on the effects of recent FDI, which 
is, arguably, the more important “engine of growth” in post-communist countries. 
Furthermore, most of the FDI-related research focuses on its indirect effect, such that 
we know comparatively little about the direct effect of foreign takeovers on domestic 
companies and the choices of mode of foreign-market access (greenfield vs. brown-
field) that foreign investors make.
Based on data covering the experience of Czech companies around the time 
of the Czech Republic’s entry into the EU and using the matched difference-in-
differences approach, we find that foreign takeovers significantly boost several cor-
porate performance indicators in manufacturing industries facing less international 
competition (on local or international markets), but have little effect in other 
industries. Workers of these firms benefit from the acquisitions as well in terms of 
their total wage bills. (We are unable to decompose the wage bill effects into wage 
and employment effects.) These findings are consistent with the argument that 
domestic-owned firms in manufacturing industries that face direct international 
competition do not need to be “disciplined” by foreign owners.30 Our study com-
plements the results of Alfaro (2003), who, in a cross-country study of FDI effects, 
finds that manufacturing FDI generates a positive growth effect, while the impact is 
ambiguous in the service sector. The absence of a statistically or economically 
significant effect of takeovers on service-sector firms may be driven by market 
regulation or structure and motivates future work on service-sector FDI.
29 We performed a number of robustness checks, which signaled little sensitivity of these conclusions to 
sample choices or to details of the estimation technique. Among other checks, we tried dropping the last 
year of the sample (2005), where there is somewhat less data, and we also experimented with using only 
industries where the sample coverage of the firm population was above the 30th percentile of the industry 
distribution of coverage. Instead of following the performance indicators for each year after the acquisition 
separately, we additionally re-estimated the matching exercises while focusing on 2-year and 3-year mov-
ing average windows of performance, and we also assessed the sensitivity to defining exporting industries 
using 1995–1997 data instead of the whole sample period and using Slovak industry trade data instead of 
Czech. Finally, we estimated the effects using panel-data techniques, controlling for company fixed effects 
and company time trends, but using only those domestic firms which could be matched to takeover firms. 
The results were consistent with those reported here and are available upon request.
30 In a related analysis, Konings et al. (2003) suggest that exposure to international trade and competition 
is one of the key driving forces of the restructuring of Ukrainian firms during 1998–2000.
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